Judicial Veto and the Ohio Plan by Selden, Edward
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 1 
January 1923 
Judicial Veto and the Ohio Plan 
Edward Selden 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Selden, Judicial Veto and the Ohio Plan, 9 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 060 (1923). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
JUDICIAL VETO AND THE OHIO PLAN.
Recent periodicals testify to a spirit of dissatisfaction
among certain groups of people, particularly the labor party,
with what they consider the usurped authority of the courts
in declaring legislative acts to be void because of unconsti-
tutionality.
Before we can arrive at an adequate conception of the
justice of the power exercised by the Supreme Court to de-
clare statutes unconstitutional we must first understand the
historical development of the power and its function in our
political system. When we have learned something of the
origin of the power we will be better equipped to discuss
the advisability of modifying it according to the method
employed in Ohio.
When the United States saw fit, in April, 1917, to cast
her lot with those nations which sought the overthrow of the
German Imperial Government, President Wilson said our
sons were going into the field of battle to "Make the World
Safe for Democracy." Almost any truly patriotic American
if he is two or three generations removed from his European
ancestors will unhesitatingly admit that we have by far the
most democratic form of government in the world. Yet if
we accept Mr. Webster's definition that a "Democracy is
a form of government where the supreme power is in the
hands of the people and directly exercised by them," we
shall be conipelled to admit that the English system where
the prime minister may be removed at any time when his
policy becomes incompatible with the wishes of the people,
gives the voters a more immediate and direct influence in
the guiding of affairs of state.
No eulogy of the English or any other foreign state is
comprehended within the scope of this article. It is intended
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merely to point out that our system is in many ways rigid
and inelastic. We have our own special brand of liberty
which is widely divorced from the caprice of the people. In
no other particular is the rigidity of the American system
better exemplified than in our famous policy of judicial re-
view. We are the only civilized country in the world today
where an act of the legislature is subject to nullification by
the Supreme Court. In England there is not even a written
constitution, while in France and Switzerland, though a
written instrument exists, it is left to the honor of the legis-
lators to determine whether or not a particular act is within
the powers granted them by the constitution.
Many plausible arguments might be presented to uphold
a system of government which protects human rights against
the momentary storm of popular enthusiasm or fanaticism.
Perhaps we have a higher type of democracy than any other
country. We must leave that discussion to the student of
political science. Suffice it to state that the theory of judicial
review is a unique idea. 1T is one which will not bear
thoughtless handling because it gives to our whole political
system an appearance of ultra conservatism which foreign
countries regard as undemocratic. As liberty is almost a
fetich with Americans, we dare not accept this most signifi-
cant doctrine as law unless it can be clearly shown that it
was so intended by the framers of the Constitution and is
specificaly stated or inescapably implied therein.
To flnd the origin of the present theory we must search
even back of the Constitution. The charters of the American
colonies gave the citizens certain rights which were enforced
by the British government. When the fetters of allegiance
to Great Britain were severed after the Revolution, the will
of the people as expressed in the Constitution was substi-
tuted for the power of the crown. Thus the concept of cons-
titutional supremacy arose originally from the colonial
charters, and acts were actually held void in New York,
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Rhode Island and Virginia before the validity of any federal
statute was impeached.
So powerful was the English doctrine of immunity of
legislative enactments that no statute was declared uncon-
stitutional until 1814 when one was so held in the case of
Dupuy v. Wickwire.' The question was most ably discussed
by C. J. John Marshall in one of the most famous American
cases, Marbury v. Madison.2 In this case we agree in the
part of the opinion which cites Article VI, Sec. II of the
Constitution as vesting an implied duty upon the judges to
uphold the Constitution wherever it might conflict with other
statutes or acts of the legislature. The article is as follows:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." There
seems no escaping the clear meaning of this article, and when
it is considered with the oath which all judges must take to
support the Constitution there can be little doubt as to its
practical effect. The other arguments in the case relative to
written constitutions perhaps carried some weight in 1803,
but they are not significant now.
Since Marbury v. Madison and the Dred Scott s case, the
theory of the right of courts to declare acts void has been
accepted with few dissenting voices in a long series of de-
cisions both in the Federal and State courts. It is admitted
by most authorities that the framers of the Constitution
intended this great power to vest in the courts, that it is
the imperative implication of the document itself and that
the judges of our courts are bound to observe the laws and
policies of our people as they find them, showing due regard
always to the spirit and true purpose of the framers of the
law as nearly as they can construe that purpose or intent.
1. 1 D. Chipman 237 (Vermont).
2. 1 Cranch, 137.
3. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard, 393.
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Being familiar as we are with the history of the question
we cannot agree with those radicals in our body politic who
would wholly dispense with judicial review. We regard it as
a welcome safeguard and a necessary conclusion under our
present Constitution.
However, we do feel that the power of declaring acts
unconstitutional as it exists in the Supreme Court today has
been abused and exercised in contravention of the spirit of
the law as it was expressed by Thomas Jefferson and John
Adams, as it is expressed today and as it has been expressed
almost with unanimity of feeling by judges since the question
was first mooted.
In theory our government is divided into three separate
and distinct branches. To the legislative branch is delegated
the making of the laws. The men who compose this branch
of the government are much more directly the representatives
of the people than are the judges of the Supreme Court.
Many of them are as able lawyers as any who sit upon the
bench. They are under oath not to violate the Constitution
and surely it was never intended that the judicial branch of
the government by its implied power should declare their
acts void except on the clearest and most palpable violation
of the inalienable rights granted by the supreme law of the
land.
This view has always been expressed by the courts from
the very earliest cases. In Com. v. Smith,4 C. J. Tilgham
said: "For weighty reasons it has been assumed as a prin-
ciple in constitutional construction by the Supreme Court
of the United States, by this court and by every other court
of reputation in the United States that an act of the legis-
lature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the
constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reason-
able doubt."
In 1796 C. J. Chase said:5 "I would never exercise the
4. 4 Binn., 117 (Penn.)
5. Ware v. Hylton, 8 Dall. 17L
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power to declare an act unconstitutional except in a very
clear case."
In Grimball v. Ross,6 J. Charlton said: "No nice
doubts, no critical exposition of words, no abstract rules of
interpretation suitable in a contest between individuals ought
to be resorted to in deciding the constitutionality of a stat-
ute. This violation of a constitutional right ought to be as
obvious to the comprehension of every man as an axiomatic
truth, as that the parts are equal to the whole."
The people of Ohio in 1912, influenced by the legal
considerations which have just been mentioned amended their
constitution of 1852, by a vote of 264,922 to 244,375 to include
the following phrase in Article four, Section two: "No law
shall be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme
Court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the
judges except in the affirmance of judgment of a court of
appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void."
Ohio is today the only State in the Union which pos-
sesses a clause in the constitution directly conferring this
power upon the courts. The dissatisfaction with the implied
power of the courts as it is exercised in other States can no
longer exist in Ohio.
The Ohio plan is distinctly a compromise between two
factions and it is becoming more popular there all of the time
as a law which eliminates the four to three decision, so justly
criticised, and yet affords ample protection for all fund-
amental rights.
There have been but two cases referring directly to this
particular clause of the fourth Article since its enactment.
The first was State ex rel. v, Fidelity Co.,7 and the sec-
ond was State ex rel. v. Miller.8 In both these cases the con-
stitutionality of the act in question was upheld. In the latter
case by a three to three vote, one judge being absent. In
6. T. U. P. Charlt. 175 (Georgia).
7. 96 Ohio St. 259.
8. 87 Ohio St. 80.
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both cases the judges stressed the point which had been
maintained by their predecessors since the earliest times in
Ohio; that to hold an act unconstitutional it must be clearly
and beyond any per-adventure in opposition to fundamental
rights.
In the Fidelity case the Judge makes some remarks
which throw some light upon the reason for the general ap-
proval which the law has met with in the courts of the
State. He says: "The veto power was exercised almost
from the beginning by the Supreme Court of Ohio, but al-
ways by an implied power. A vast amount of discussion
with a display of much learning was displayed in recent
years with regard to the exercise of this implied power, both
as to state and federal courts. As to the merits of this
controversy we are not called upon to answer, and do not
answer, for happily in Ohio our power in this respect, with
its pronounced limitations, is one of express grant."
The same motives which prompted the people of Ohio to
amend the Constitution might well prompt a similar change
in the federal law. To declare any act void after it has
been in operation for a year or perhaps even two years must
almost of necessity work a great hardship upon a large
number of people. It should never be done except in a
perfectly clear case.
Since 1814 the United States Supreme Court has held
acts of the legislature unconstitutional in nine cases by a
vote of five to four. This means that the opinion of a single
judge has outweighed the will of the people as expressed
through their representatives in nine cases where the uncon-
stitutionality was neither clear nor axiomatic but must of
necessity have been very doubtful indeed. Such a policy
is directly subversive of the spirit of the law as it is every-
where expressed in our courts.
It will be contended by those who are satisfied with
the present system that the law implies only that a ma-
jority of the judges shall be of the opinion that the statute
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss1/6
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
is CLEARLY unconstitutional. The actual cases prove,
however, that the decisions have turned on technicalities, and
that quibbling and fine discriminations in construction have
been resorted to.
Usually when a human being, and even judges are hu-
man, becomes convinced that a certain proposition is true
or false he is simultaneously of the conviction that the truth
or falsity of the proposition is perfectly clear and that any
one should be able to see it. Unfortunately the same love
of logic and clarity of thought leads his brother in the
learned profession just as honestly to the opposite conclu-
sion which is quite as obvious and apparent as the first. The
fact is that the only way to eliminate the evil of the doubtful
decision in these cases where such a decision was never
intended to control is some plan similar to the Ohio scheme
or such an amendment as is to be presented by Senator
Borah at the next Congress, providing, "That no law shall
be declared unconstitutional without the vote of at least
seven of the nine judges." There are other solutions offered
such as the increase of the judiciary to ten judges. The
adoption of one of these suggestions or of some other directed
toward the same end, should, we believe, be a matter for the
very careful consideration of the legislators when Congress
again assembles.
EDWARD SELDEN, '24.
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